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FOREWORD
ORGANIZATIONAL CODE: A COMPLEXITY THEORY
PERSPECTIVE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REGULATION

Andrea M Matwyshyn*

A technology revolution has changed our world in the last quarter
century and fundamentally altered our social relationship to information
exchange; we have been through a great information transformation.
Our new technology tools bring positive consequences for human
development by expanding the scope of what an individual can
accomplish. However, this expansion has complicated our ability to
govern on the person-society border. By doing so, it has highlighted the
importance of parsing the ways that regulation is generated in our
complex' social system and, particularly, by whom.
One source of regulation in our current system derives from what
have been termed "architectures of control." Architectures of control
refer to hierarchical impositions of social values that occur through
legal code on the one hand, and computer code on the other hand,2 what
has been termed by Lawrence Lessig as "East Coast Code" and "West
Coast Code." Both East Coast and West Coast Code impose a top-down
order that, unless carefully constructed, can easily stifle innovation and
the evolution of the technology-mediated marketplace of goods and
ideas.
However, architectures of control only present one part of the
dynamic regulatory portrait of our technology-mediated complex social
* Andrea M. Matwyshyn is the Executive Director of the Center for Information Research
and an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Florida. She is also an Affiliate of the Centre
for Economics & Policy at the University of Cambridge. She can be reached at andreamm@ufl.edu.
1. Complexity, in general, is the science examining the interrelationship, interaction, and
interconnectivity of various elements within a system and between a system and the environment
in which it exists. The hallmarks of complex adaptive systems are distributed control, connectivity,
co-evolution, sensitive dependence on initial conditions, emergent order, a state not in equilibrium,
and a paradoxical condition of both order and chaos. Complex systems are characterized by a large
number of similar but independent actors who persistently move, respond, and evolve in relation
to each other in an increasingly sophisticated manner to generate emergent order. See, e.g.,
MITCHELL RESNICK, TURTLES, TERMITES AND TRAFFIC JAMS (1997); JoHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN
ORDER: How ADAPTATION BUILDS COMPLExITY (1995).
2. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE (1999).

system. Equally, if not more important, are bottom-up 3 regulatory
forces:4 dynamic strategic interactions of actors in our system generate
their own type of regulation of the system, regulation that might be
termed "organizational code." 5 Stated another way, our ability to
3. At least one noted legal scholar has highlighted the importance of considering bottom-up
norms and legal emergence. See Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardizationandthe Integration
of Text and Machine, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1135-37 (2002). However, most Internet
regulation scholarly work to date has focused on top-down governance. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig,
Foreword, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 987 (2000);
Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Propertyand the Organizationof Information Production,22 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 81 (2002); Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653
(2003); Pamela Samuelson, Privacyas IntellectualProperty,52 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (2000); Mark
Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521 (2003).
4. For various applications of complex systems theory to other legal contexts see, e.g.,
David G. Post and David R. Johnson, "Chaos Prevailingon Every Continent": Toward a New
Theory ofDecentralizedDecision-makingin Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 1055 (1998)
(arguing that legal theory would be enriched by paying attention to algorithms derived from the
study of complex systems in contexts such as competitive federalism and the "patching" algorithm).
See also, e.g., Susan P. Crawford, The Biology of the BroadcastFlag,25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 603 (2003); Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless
Communication, 82 TEX. L. REV. 863 (2004); Susan W. Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law for
Cyberspace:DistributedSecurity, 10 B.U. J. SC.& TECH. L. 1 (2004); Robert A. Creo, Mediation
2004: The Art and the Artist, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 1017 (2004); Jim Chen, Webs of Life:
Biodiversity Conservationas a Species ofInformation Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 495 (2004); Scott
H. Hughes, UnderstandingConflict in aPostmodern World,87 MARQ. L. REV. 681 (2004); Daniel
A. Farber, ProbabilitiesBehaving Badly: Complexity Theory andEnvironmental Uncertainty,37
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145 (2003); Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Dangerat the Edge
of Chaos:PredictingViolent Behaviorin aPost-DaubertWorld, 24 CARDozoL. REV. 1845 (2003);
J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in
the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757 (2003); Daniel S. Goldberg, And the Walls Came
Tumbling Down: How ClassicalScientific Fallacies Undermine the Validity of Textualism and
Originalism,39 Hous. L. REV. 463 (2002); Thomas R. McLean,ApplicationofAdministrativeLaw
to Health Care Reform: The Real Politik of Crossing the Quality Chasm, 16 J.L. & HEALTH 65
(2001-2002); James Salzman et al., Regulatory Traffic Jams, 2 Wyo. L. REV. 253 (2002); Jeffrey
G. Miller, Evolutionary Statutory Interpretation:Mr. Justice Scalia Meets Darwin, 20 PACE L.
REV. 409 (2000); Patricia A. Martin, Bioethics and the Whole: Pluralism, Consensus, and the
TransmutationofBioethicalMethods into Gold, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 316 (1999); J.B. Ruhl, The
Co-Evolution of Sustainable Development and Environmental Justice: Cooperation, Then
Competition, Then Conflict, 9 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 161 (1999); Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos,
Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web ofLaw, Management Theory, and Law Related Services
at the Millennium, 66 TENN. L. REV. 137 (1998); JeffL. Lewin, The Genesis andEvolution ofLegal
UncertaintyAbout "Reasonable Medical Certainty," 57 MD. L. REV. 380 (1998); J.B. Ruhl, The
Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution ofLaw and Society and its
PracticalMeaningfor Democracy,49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996); Gerald Andrews Emison, The
Potentialfor Unconventional Progress: Complex Adaptive Systems and Environmental Quality
Policy, 7 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 167 (1996).
5. Organizational code differs from computer code as a method of regulation. Whereas
computer code regulates on the individual level through stealthy imposition of the value of a
creator, organizational code regulates on the person-society border and is inherently sociobehavioral in nature, arising out of aggregate behaviors.

govern, particularly through technology and intellectual property law, is
impacted by structures of order that are spontaneously arising out of the
technology-mediated information exchanges of individual actors within
our system. Global patterns are emerging6 from the aggregation of these
individual behaviors that could not have been forecast simply by
understanding the behavior of one particular actor in the system.
Integral parts of this organizational code are legal behaviors. For
example, organizational code includes the behavioral, strategic, and
legal norms of actors in response to changes in substantive law, the role
of the transactional bar in shaping the comparative power and strategies
of actors within the system, and evolving contracting norms.7
For our legal system, it is this emergent organizational code that
most complicates governance in the post-information transformation
era. Technology has catalyzed the pace of emergence in our system,
stressing preexisting tensions in our legal frameworks and creating new
tensions. Emergent structures that morph at the lightning pace of
technology are more difficult to govern than the more slowly morphing
structures of the past. As demonstrated by cases such as MGM Studios,
Inc. v. Grokster and the fervor of our social debate over the
appropriateness of patenting code and genetic matter, our courts and
legislatures continue to grapple with technology and intellectual
property issues with, at best, mixed success. They struggle to merely
stay abreast of technological innovation while not stifling its
development.
To craft legal paradigms that can withstand future iterations of
technological innovation, legislators and judges should recognize and
embrace organizational code as a tool of governance; they should
leverage the naturally occurring structures of our technology-mediated
complex social system. By harnessing emergent technology and
intellectual property behaviors, legal tools can assist in socially
engineering' our complex social system toward generating order rather
6. See, e.g., STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED LivEs OF ANTS, BRAINS,
CrrtEs AND SOFrwARE (2001).
7. Borrowing terms from Eric Raymond, organizational code can be said to be order
developing through a babbling "bazaar," which permits norms to percolate to widespread
acceptance, while legal code and, frequently, computer code develop order through a "cathedral"
style where norms are hierarchically imposed. See ERIC STEVEN RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND
THE BAZAAR, available at http://www.catb.org/-esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar/
(last visited May 3, 2004).
8. In computer security, social engineering means using offline means of human interaction
to obtain critical technology security information, usually passwords. See, e.g., Sarah Granger,
Social Engineering Fundamentals, Part I: Hacker Tactics, available at http://www.
securityfocus.com/infocus/1527 (last visited May 3, 2004). But here I use social engineering to
refer to processes of using means to "trick" certain legal construction into being built to enable the
system to govern itself in a more socially beneficial manner.

than chaos. Law can be used to gently nudge the aggregate behaviors of
the complex system toward more successfully harmonizing the
competing legal, business, and social interests within it. This type of
carefully built set of legal constructs that works to positively shift
organizational code can be termed an "architecture of growth."
Architectures of growth are emergent constructs themselves. They
arise from the organizational code of legal frameworks that facilitate
long run commercial cooperation among actors in the system. Each of
these component legal frameworks is adaptive in nature; each one
"tricks" the system into self-correcting and generating organizational
code that pushes the system toward predictability without stifling
innovation or harming consumers.9 Therefore, architectures of growth
should emerge in tandem with and out of the natural emergence
processes of organizational code in the system.
The task legislators, judges, and technologists face in generating
architectures of growth is truly daunting: it requires regulating a
complex social system that is frequently layered on top of other
complex systems. For example, when we attempt to craft any type of
Internet legal regime, we are really attempting to regulate the emerging
organizational code of at least two complex systems: the Internet itself
and our social system. The Internet has demonstrated itself to be a
complex system. It is composed of numerous independent actors, acting
in clustered groups, at least in the context of the Web, ° frequently
following local rules" and demonstrating increasingly complicated
visible patterns of natural organization of behaviors and norms.
Therefore, guiding the interaction between this complex system and our
social system necessitates understanding the history of two conjoined
but different bodies of emerging organizational code.
Generating architectures of growth also requires monitoring whether
organizational code is consonant with or competes with architectures of
control. Coexistence of architectures of growth and architectures of
control results in a self-correcting system that is capable of maintaining
predictability while absorbing new organizational code generated by
innovation. A conflict between the two architectures, or an absence of
9. Organizational code includes both market and non-market strategic decisions of actors
within the complex adaptive system. For a discussion of non-market strategy, see, e.g., S.L.
Jarvenpaa & E.H. Tiller, IntegratingMarket, Technology, andPolicy Opportunitiesin E-Business
Strategy, 8 J. STRATEGIC INFO. Sys. 235 (1999).
10. ALBERTO-LASZLO BARABASI, LINKED (2002).

11. For example, outside of terms of use, online communities often have additional
community rules of conduct. See, e.g., AOL Instant Messenger Web Chat Rules & Etiquette,
availableat http://www.aol.com/community/rules.html (last visited May 3, 2004).

an architecture of growth, results in a system driven by stop-gap legal
measures. Such an approach always remains one step behind the
bleeding edge of innovation, stumbling society non-adaptively in the
direction of doctrinal chaos.
In summary, in order to generate a social system that both facilitates
innovation and provides safety nets of consumer protection, technology
and intellectual property policy problems should be approached as
organized complexity problems. 2 Recognizing the naturally occurring
patterns of organization arising from strategic legal behaviors, we can
guide the emergence of the organizational code in our system by
generating architectures of growth. Architectures of growth offer a
means of letting the system steer itself toward order without overdetermining the exact contours of what that order should look like. Only
a flexible system of this type, sensitive to the natural structures of
complex systems, will be able to both nurture and govern a generation
of future technologies that are currently nascent only in the minds of
their creators.

12. For further discussion of complexity theory, see, e.g., Y. BAR-YAM, DYNAMICS OF
COMPLEXSYsTEMS: STUDIES INNONLINEARiTY (1997); BARABASI, supra note 10.

